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ABSTRACT 
International taxation is undergoing considerable legal and policy 
transformations, which will have deep normative ramifications in 
business and legal practices worldwide. In particular, international 
tax disputes will increase in the short term as a consequence of the 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) implementation, which is 
considerably modifying tax regulation in virtually all jurisdictions. 
BEPS also aims to resolve tax-related disputes more effectively as 
expressed by the so-called Action 14, which will generate further 
challenges for many governments. Traditionally, Mutual Agreement 
Procedure (MAP) has been the main dispute resolution method in 
the taxation area, and China insists on continuing to use MAP in its 
bilateral tax treaties. However, with the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) Model Convention and 
United Nations Model Convention, there is a trend to incorporate 
mandatory arbitration as a complementary part of MAP in resolving 
tax-related disputes. While developed countries mainly support 
mandatory arbitration, developing states, like China, are reluctant to 
lose their national sovereignty in the taxation area. Through 
comparing dispute resolution methods under bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs) and bilateral tax treaties, this Article critically discusses 
the advantages of incorporating mandatory arbitration in bilateral tax 
treaties and demonstrates that national sovereignty will not be 
decreased by it. As a result, the Article argues that it would, in fact, be 
beneficial for China to adopt the mandatory arbitration method, which 
would further strengthen the global reform initiated by the OECD.  
INTRODUCTION 
oreign investment is an important resource for the development 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or “China”), and China 
is trying to attract as much foreign investment as possible. For example, 
there are a growing number of special economic zones (SEZs) 
established along the coast and in the inner places of mainland China.1 
1 Koel Roy Choudhury, Special Economic Zones in China, 7 SIES J. MGMT. 114, 114 
(2010). 
F 
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In SEZs,2 the negative list3 is regulated, and it can provide greater 
certainty for the foreign investors.4 The negative list specifies what 
projects are prohibited from receiving foreign investment funds.5 In 
comparison, the positive list specifies what projects may receive 
foreign investment.6 National Treatment (NT) prohibits discrimination 
and requires that “a WTO member may not discriminate on the basis 
of the national origin of the product.”7 In addition, the pre-
establishment NT is also provided in the SEZs.8 In the past, foreign 
investors could only enjoy the NT after they founded their firms in 
mainland China.9 However, based on the pre-establishment NT, foreign 
2 SEZs are defined as “geographically delimited areas, frequently physically secured, 
that are usually, but not always, outside the customs territory of the host country.” 
Stephen Creskoff & Peter Walkenhorst, Implications of WTO Disciplines for Special 
Economic Zones in Developing Countries 7 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 4892, 2009), 
https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-4892. The aim of SEZs is to 
attract foreign investment through different policy tools. CONNIE CARTER & ANDREW 
HARDING, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN ASIAN MARKET ECONOMIES 3 (2010). See also 
Julien Chaisse & Xueliang Ji, The Pervasive Problem of Special Economic Zones for 
International Economic Law—Tax, Investment, and Trade Issues, 20 WORLD TRADE REV. 
(forthcoming 2020, on file with author). 
3 China Simplifies “Negative List” in Further Easing of Foreign Investment 
Restrictions, JONES DAY (Aug. 2018), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2018/08/ 
china-simplifies-negative-list-in-further-easing-o (“The Negative List is a list of industries 
for which foreign investment is either prohibited, or subject to greater scrutiny and 
restrictions.”). 
4 Qinhua Wang, The Management of Foreign Private Equity Funds Involves Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Exchange in the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone, 
50 CHINESE ECON. 249, 256 (2017). 
5 Gladie Lui, Shanghai Pilot Free Trade Zone: Shaping of China’s Future Foreign 
Investment Environment, 40 INT’L TAX J., July-Aug. 2014, at 31, 32. 
6 “Positive-List” Approach Popular at WTOI Investment Talks, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE  
& SUSTAINABLE DEV. (2002), http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges/news/positive-
list-approach-popular-at-wtoi-investment-talks. 
7 Peter M. Gerhart & Michael S. Baron, Understanding National Treatment: 
The Participatory Vision of the WTO, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 505, 505 (2004). In 
fact, NT is a fundamental principle of the WTO to the extent that very few exceptions may 
apply to it. See generally Julien Chaisse, Exploring the Confines of International Investment 
and Domestic Health Protections—Is a General Exceptions Clause a Forced Perspective? 
39 AM. J.L. & MED. 332, 361 (2013). 
8 See generally Qianwen Zhang, Opening Pre-Establishment National Treatment in 
International Investment Agreements: An Emerging “New Normal” in China?, 11 ASIAN J. 
WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 437 (2016). 
9 Delei Peng & Xiuyan Fei, China’s Free Trade Zones: Regulatory Innovation, Legal 
Assessment and Economic Implication, 50 CHINESE ECON. 238, 239 (2017). 
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investors enjoy equal favorable rights compared to the local investors 
in admittance to the local market.10 Meanwhile, in SEZs, foreign 
investors enjoy more preferential treatment compared to local firms, 
and the more preferential treatment is fine under the NT.11 All these 
measures are aimed at attracting more foreign investment.  
Among the measures at China’s disposal, taxation is a great tool to 
attract foreign direct investment. Taxation, much like GDP, is very 
significant for China. Based on the PRC Ministry of Finance’s 2016 
taxation report, tax revenue12 is around CNY (Chinese Yuan) 16 trillion 
while the income of taxation is about CNY 13 trillion.13 In developed 
states, such as the United States, tax revenue mainly comes from 
personal income tax.14 In contrast to developed states, developing 
states like China are focusing more on taxing corporations and 
enterprises.15 In 2016, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) pointed out that weak investment has 
contributed to low productivity growth.16 The report illustrates that 
annual global foreign direct investment (FDI) was down over 18% 
in non-OECD countries, including China, while there was a rise of 
6% in OECD countries.17 This disparity partly exists because OECD 
countries have initiated a lot of measures to provide a predictable, 
10 RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 198 (Oxford University Press, 2012). See generally Julien Chaisse & 
Mitsuo Matsushita, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative: Mapping the World Trade 
Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 J. WORLD TRADE 163, 169 (2018). 
11 See Wanda Tseng & Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Some 
Lessons for Other Countries, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Feb. 2002), https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/pdp/2002/pdp03.pdf. 
12 Ministry of Finance of the People’s Republic of China, Fiscal Revenue and 
Expenditure Situation in 2016 (2017), http://gks.mof.gov.cn/zhengfuxinxi/tongjishuju/ 
201701/t20170123_2526014.html (Chinese report unavailable in English language, on file 
with author). 
13 Id. 
14 Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution Via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1633 (2004). 
15 Id. 
16 Yvan Guillemette, The Contribution of Weak Investment to the Productivity 
Slowdown, OECD ECOSCOPE (June 10, 2016), https://oecdecoscope.blog/2016/06/10/the-
contribution-of-weak-investment-to-the-productivity-slowdown/. 
17  FDI in Figures, OECD (2017), http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/FDI-
in-Figures-April-2017.pdf. See generally Michael J. Enright, China’s Inward Investment: 
Approach and Impact, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY: BILATERAL, 
REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL LAW AND POLICY 28 (Julien Chaisse ed., 2019). 
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stable investment environment to attract FDI, including the mandatory 
arbitration mechanism for resolving tax-related disputes.18  
Even though the MAP process is the main dispute resolution method 
used for tax-related disputes in bilateral tax treaties, it resulted in 
inefficiency problems in many countries, including BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa).19 On October 5, 2015, the 
OECD released its final report on improving the effectiveness of 
dispute resolution mechanisms (Action 14) under its Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS).20 Fifteen BEPS actions were 
released in this report.21 Action 14 also represents a commitment 
by countries to implement the “minimum standard” on dispute 
resolution.22 This report states that the G20 and OECD countries 
participating in the BEPS project have agreed to implement three 
overarching principles that represent a minimum standard, with respect 
to the MAP process, by incorporating these principles into domestic 
law and/or their treaty interpretation and application.23 The “minimum 
standard” principles include the following: 
1. Allowing taxpayers access to the MAP process when they
meet the requirements;
2. Verifying that domestic administrative procedures do not
block access to the MAP process; and
3. Having countries implement Article 25 of the OECD Model
Tax Convention in good faith.24
18 Id. See also Julien Chaisse & Christian Bellak, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Preliminary Reflections on New Methodology, 
3 TRANSNAT’L CORP. REV. 3, 4 (2011); Julien Chaisse & Christian Bellak, Navigating the 
Expanding Universe of Investment Treaties—Creation and Use of Critical Index, 18 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 79, 83 (2015).  
19 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD), MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL, Art. 25 (2014) 
[hereinafter OECD MODEL 2014]. See also Julien Chaisse, Investor-State Arbitration in 
International Tax Dispute Resolution: A Cut Above Dedicated Tax Dispute Resolution?, 
35 VA. TAX REV. 149, 160 (2016) [hereinafter Chaisse, Investor-State].  
20 Action 14 Mutual Agreement Procedure, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-
actions/action14/ (last updated in 2019) [hereinafter Action 14 Procedure]. 
21 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
MAKING DISPUTE MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14: 2015 FINAL REPORT 3 
(2015) [hereinafter OECD ACTION 14: 2015 FINAL REPORT].  
22 Action 14 Procedure, supra note 20.  
23 OECD ACTION 14: 2015 FINAL REPORT, supra note 21, at 11. 
24 Id. at 12.  
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BRICS considered the need to improve the efficiency of MAP and 
reached an agreement to resolve this problem.25 However, the Article 
14 Report did not mention what measures the countries need to 
implement to achieve this goal.  
BEPS raises challenges for many countries with regard to settling 
international tax disputes. The objective of this Article is not to review 
the ongoing discussion and potential reform of the methods to resolve 
international tax disputes at the global level. Instead, this Article 
focuses on China’s position and, more specifically, the pros and cons 
associated with China adopting a mechanism of mandatory tax 
arbitration in the near future. This Article proposes that China is ready 
to embrace a more sophisticated mechanism for tax dispute resolution 
that involves a mixed system of mandatory arbitration. To demonstrate 
this thesis, this Article deploys analysis on five levels (and in five parts) 
that complement one another. Part I states the common methods in 
resolving tax-related disputes. Part II deals with the most significant 
concern for states when incorporating mandatory arbitration in bilateral 
tax treaties. Next, Part III analyzes the reasons why taxpayers prefer 
mandatory arbitration in resolving tax-related disputes. Part IV 
emphasizes other benefits of the tax-related mandatory arbitration. 
Finally, Part V recognizes the benefits of China adopting the tax-related 
mandatory arbitration method. 
I 
METHODS IN RESOLVING TAX-RELATED DISPUTES 
Based on the BEPS actions issued by the OECD, there are a number 
of changes to the current international taxation system, and each state 
has to adopt some measures related to their national taxation systems. 
In the long term, one goal of BEPS is to decrease tax-related disputes. 
In the short term, disputes will be more likely to arise when 
incorporating the new standards in tax matters.26 Consequently, it is 
essential to focus on the methods taxpayers always depend on when 
25 MEMORANDUM OF COOPERATION, https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/brics-
mou-for-crs.pdf (last visited October 23, 2019).  
26 See Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 14: Making Dispute Resolution 
Mechanisms More Effective, OECD 4, 18, 27 (2015), https://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/ 
discussion-draft-action-14-make-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective.pdf 
[hereinafter Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 14]. See generally Julien Chaisse & 
Xueliang Ji, “Soft Law” in International Law-Making: How Soft International Taxation 
Law is Reshaping International Economic Governance, 13 ASIAN J. WTO L. & HEALTH 
POL’Y 463 (2018).  
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faced with tax-related disputes, and they will be discussed in detail in 
the following parts. 
A. Local Remedies
There are several ways to resolve tax-related disputes. Local 
remedies can be used as a first step. Taxpayers can initiate litigation in 
the appropriate administrative tribunal. However, foreign taxpayers 
tend to disfavor this method.27 One reason for this is because they are 
not familiar with the laws of the host state. For example, foreign 
taxpayers and the competent authority of the host state may have 
different interpretations of the same issue and taxation clause.28 
Additionally, the court in the host state may be biased to some extent. 
It is inevitable for the host state to protect itself, especially when the 
disputes arise because of the host state’s policies. If the dispute contains 
issues related to the host state’s national interests, the related court or 
administrative tribunal is more likely to reject the foreign taxpayers’ 
request.29  
Bilateral tax treaties also contain a clause related to local remedies.30 
The 2014 OECD Model Convention provides that 
[t]he competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection appears to
it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a satisfactory
solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement with the competent
authority of the other Contracting State, with a view to the avoidance
of taxation which is not in accordance with the Convention.31
In other words, the MAP process can only be initiated when the 
competent authority cannot decide and resolve the disputes 
unilaterally. The related competent authority’s unilateral resolution can 
be treated as a type of local remedy. 
B. Arbitration in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
Aside from local remedies, mandatory arbitration in BITs can also 
be functional. Taxpayers tend to make claims through investment law 
27 See generally MICHAEL LANG & JEFFREY OWENS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN 
TAX MATTERS (2016). 
28 MICHAEL LANG & MARIO ZÜGER, SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN TAX TREATY LAW 
15 (2002). 
29 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27, at 982. 
30 OECD MODEL 2014, supra note 19, at 38–39. 
31 Id. 
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treaties rather than international tax treaties.32 Compared with the 
MAP dispute resolution mechanism usually in bilateral tax treaties, 
mandatory arbitration within the BITs provides a great advantage.33 
The advantage is that investors can determine when there has been a 
breach of a treaty obligation and pursue a claim.34 That is to say, “the 
investor may take action . . . to defend his or her rights accruing from 
the BIT because it is a claim of the investor himself or herself but not 
of the contracting state.”35  
With respect to the tax-related dispute resolution methods in 
bilateral tax treaties, the related competent authorities control the 
determining power.36 Without confirmation from the related competent 
authorities, the MAP process cannot be initiated.37 According to Article 
25(5) of the OECD Model Convention, the taxpayer/investor can only 
bring tax disputes to arbitration if they cannot be resolved through the 
MAP process.38 The arbitration clause in international investment law, 
however, allows foreign investors to claim their entire dispute 
to international arbitral tribunals directly.39 For instance, even if the 
national court has already ruled against an investor, the investor can 
still make a claim to an international arbitration tribunal related to the 
same issue.40 One such award took place in Deutsche Bank v. Sri 
Lanka.41 In that case, the claimant could not get a fair hearing in the 
Supreme Court of Sri Lanka and brought the claim to the international 
32 See generally Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/19 (2008) (gives one example where the claim was made through the United 
States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty regarding import tax and custom duties). 
33 Julien Chaisse, Making Tax Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective—The 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project and Beyond, 10 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 1, 21 
(2017) [hereinafter Chaisse, BEPS]. 
34 See generally Maira de Melo Vieira, The Regulation of Tax Matters in Bilateral 
Investment Treaties: A Dispute Resolution Perspective, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 63 (2014). 
35 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 26 (quoting Treaty Between the United States of 
America and Mongolia Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investment, U.S.-Mong., Oct. 6, 1994). 
36 Michael J. McIntyre, Comments on the OECD Proposal for Secret and Mandatory 
Arbitration of International Tax Disputes, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 622, 623–24 (2006). 
37 OECD MODEL 2014, supra note 19. 
38 Id. 
39 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 25. 
40 Id. at 26. 
41 See Deutsche Bank AG v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/02, Award, (Oct. 31, 2012). 
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tribunal, which held that Sri Lanka had breached the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET) principle.42  
The MAP process offers a chance for taxpayers to escape a 
potentially unfair hearing by putting the case in front of an international 
and independent arbitration tribunal. By creating a separate treaty-
based set of rules to govern host-state conduct, the taxpayer does not 
expose himself to the uncertainties of host-state laws, regulations, and 
policies.43 The MAP process gives taxpayers an alternative to the host-
state judicial system when they seek remedies from host-state actions. 
Foreign taxpayers can choose freely from the domestic remedies and 
the international arbitration method.44 However, if a tax-related dispute 
arises, the local administrative tribunal’s consideration is essential 
under the OECD Model Convention.45 If the related administrative 
body or the local court has resolved the dispute, regardless of whether 
the taxpayers are satisfied, international arbitration cannot help the 
taxpayers. This is especially so in cases regarding the competent 
authorities of developing countries for MAP. Because the competent 
authorities lack experience or are often not independent, taxpayers seek 
international arbitration to get a fair hearing and award.46 Accordingly, 
international arbitration, used in accordance with the BITs, may 
provide a substantial advantage for the taxpayer.47 
Additionally, foreign investors are more likely to bring their claims 
based on the BITs rather than international tax treaties because of the 
protection the substantive clause provides.48 The substantive clauses 
within the international investment treaties and the international tax 
42 Id. at 108. 
43 Michele Potestà, Legitimate Expectations in Investment Treaty Law: Understanding 
the Roots and the Limits of a Controversial Concept, 28 ICSID REV. 88, 88–122 (2013). 
44 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 165. 
45 OECD MODEL 2014, supra note 19. 
46 See generally Carlos Protto, Mutual Agreement Procedures in Tax Treaties: Problems 
and Needs in Developing Countries and Countries in Transition, 42 INTERTAX 176 (2014). 
47 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report, 124, 
(2015). 
48 See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment 
Agreements, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: UNDERSTANDING CONCEPTS AND 
TRACKING INNOVATIONS 101 (OECD, 2008). See generally Julien Chaisse, The Treaty 
Shopping Practice: Corporate Structuring and Restructuring to Gain Access to Investment 
Treaties and Arbitration, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L. REV. 225 (2015). 
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treaties are different, but they share the feature of nondiscrimination.49 
The differences between the two exist because the international tax 
treaties and international investment treaties do not have the same 
purpose. The principles of international investment law are National 
Treatment (NT), Most Favored Nations (MFN), Fair and Equitable 
Treatment (FET), Full Protection and Security (FPS), and Umbrella 
Clause.50 The main purposes of international tax treaties are (1) to 
prevent double taxation and double nontaxation, and (2) to properly 
allocate the financial revenue.51 On the other hand, the purpose of 
international investment treaties, particularly BITs, is to protect the 
investments that produce those revenues.52 Therefore, the scope of 
taxpayer protection offered by the international investment tax regime 
is larger in comparison to that provided by the bilateral tax treaties.53 
International tax treaties offer, to some extent, limited protections to 
taxpayers.  
At the same time, taxpayers often use the FET standard to protect 
their profits when faced with tax-related disputes under the BITs. This 
is because arbitral tribunals tends to expand the scope of this standard.54 
For instance, the Roussalis v. Romania award expanded the scope of 
the FET standard and stated that it is not precisely defined beyond 
general principles.55 In the Occidental Exploration v. Ecuador case, the 
tribunal explained the FET standard aims to provide a stable and 
predictable environment for foreign investors.56 Investors will make 
their investment plans based on their expectations.57 Because the tax 
regulations issued by the host government destroyed this predictability, 
49 JULIEN CHAISSE, THE E15 INITIATIVE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
TAXATION: FROM COEXISTENCE TO COOPERATION 11 (2016) [hereinafter CHAISSE & THE 
E15]. 
50 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 161. See generally Julien Chaisse, 
Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign Investment—How Will the 
New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime?, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 51 
(2012). 
51 See Ariane Pickering, Why Negotiate Tax Treaties, U.N. DEP’T ECON. & SOC. AFF., 
May 2013, at 3–4. 
52 CHAISSE & THE E15, supra note 49, at 12. 
53 Id. 
54 See id. at 11. 
55 See Spyridon Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 318 
(Dec. 1, 2011). 
56 Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. UN 
3467, Final Award, 62–63 (London Ct. of Int’l Arb. 2004). 
57 Id. at 62. 
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the related tax regulations have breached the FET standard.58 For 
instance, as long as foreign investors are treated worse in the taxation 
area, they will file their claims against the host government based on 
this standard. However, it should be noted that this criterion does not 
require equity because the FET standard is an absolute standard.59 That 
means it is acceptable for the foreign investors to be treated more 
favorably than local individuals and companies. Furthermore, based 
on section 25(3) of the 2014 OECD Model Convention, mandatory 
arbitration can only be initiated once the final taxation is imposed.60 
Additionally, “[t]he competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall endeavor to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties 
or doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the 
Convention.”61 However, no matter whether the taxation is actually 
imposed, foreign investors can still proceed with arbitration as long as 
they find the taxation is a breach of their rights under the BITs.62 Yet 
the terms of many bilateral tax treaties and double tax treaties do not 
incorporate mandatory arbitration as a dispute resolution method.63 The 
MAP process is still an essential part of the process before taxpayers 
can reach mandatory arbitration even if the bilateral tax treaties contain 
a mandatory arbitration clause. For example, in the United States-
Canada bilateral tax treaty, taxpayers cannot directly reach the 
mandatory arbitration clause.64 And what is worse, no matter the 
unilateral dispute resolution process used by the related competent 
authority or in the MAP process, lack of transparency means the related 
state will have more power to control the whole process without 
protecting the foreign taxpayers’ interests.65  
In addition, under the international investment treaties and BITs, 
arbitral awards are enforced in accordance with the corresponding rules 
58 Id. at 64. 
59 See DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 133. 
60 See OECD MODEL 2014, supra note 19. 
61 Id. 
62 See CHAISSE & THE E15, supra note 49.  
63 See generally Ehab Farah, Mandatory Arbitration of International Tax Disputes: 
A Solution in Search of a Problem, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 703 (2009). 
64 See Convention Between Canada and the United States of America with Respect 
to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Can.-U.S., Sept. 26, 1980, IRS Treaty, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/canada.pdf [hereinafter Can.-U.S. Tax Convention].  
65 See generally Michael Lennard, International Tax Arbitration in Developing 
Countries, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN TAX MATTERS 1060–62 (2016). 
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of the chosen arbitral institution so that the award is easier to enforce.66 
For instance, the International Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States67 
and the respective BITs are responsible for enforcing the arbitral 
awards determined by the International Center for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID).68 The Arbitration Rules and the 
respective BITs govern the enforcement of the awards as determined 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).69 Article 54 of the ICSID emphasizes that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this 
Convention as binding and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed 
by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment of a 
court in that State.”70 This means that states must enforce the arbitral 
awards. Besides, the awards initiated by the arbitral tribunal in the 
bilateral tax treaties only bind the two competent authorities.71 The 
awards reached by the arbitral tribunal in BITs do not only bind the 
contracting parties but also bind the signatories of ICSID’s Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States.72 Furthermore, because ICSID is an agency of the 
World Bank, the member states of the World Bank will voluntarily 
enforce ICSID awards.73 Therefore, to avoid adverse consequences, 
such as sanctions, from noncompliance with ICSID awards, most of the 
losing states comply with the final awards, which leads to a very robust 
and trusted dispute mechanism.74 Although taxpayers should file their 
claims based on the bilateral tax treaties, a phenomenon exists in which 
a great number of states do not incorporate a mandatory arbitration 
66 Vincent O. Orlu Nmehielle, Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International 
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), 7 ANN. SURV. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 21, 30, 36 (2001). 
67 See INT’L. CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, ICSID CONVENTION, 
REGULATIONS AND RULES (2006), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/icsiddocs/ 
ICSID%20Convention%20English.pdf. 
68 CHAISSE & THE E15, supra note 49. 
69 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 27.  
70 Dany Khayat, Enforcement of Awards in ICSID Arbitration, MAYER BROWN  
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/perspectives-events/publications/2011/ 
12/enforcement-of-awards-in-icsid-arbitration. 
71 See id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. 
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clause in their bilateral tax treaties. China is one of these states.75 In this 
respect, foreign investors tend to increasingly use the arbitration clause 
under BITs to resolve their taxation disputes at the international level. 
Because states are worried about their own national sovereignty, 
they tend to narrow the scope of taxation disputes to arbitration under 
BITs.76 As discussed above, many states are limiting the scope of the 
FET standard.77 The Nations Energy Corp. v. Republic of Panama case, 
for instance, interprets the BIT at issue to exclude claims stemming 
from taxation matters based on the FET standard.78 Additionally, if 
there are no explicit words mentioning or interpreting the FET standard 
in a BIT, the tax measures are excluded from consideration in the 
treaty. If the FET standard is not explicitly set out in the treaties, it 
cannot be applied to the tax measures.79 Moreover, there is a growing 
trend that contracting parties tend to limit—or even exclude—the 
tax measures from the BIT.80 For instance, the 2015 Indian Model BIT-
EU excludes taxation from the scope of the treaty.81 Another example 
is the agreement between the governments of Hong Kong and New 
Zealand to promote and protect investments.82 The Hong Kong-New 
Zealand agreement states that it “shall not apply to matters of taxation 
in the area of either Contracting Party.”83 Instead, “[s]uch matters shall 
be governed by the domestic laws of each Contracting Party and the 
terms of any agreement relating to taxation concluded between the 
Contracting Parties.”84 
75 See generally Org. for Econ. Co-op. and Dev., Multilateral Convention to Implement 
Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS (last updated Oct. 18, 2019), http://www. 
oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-
prevent-beps.htm (follow “Signatories and Parties (MLI Positions)” hyperlink) [hereinafter 
MLI Positions] (China signed the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related 
Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting but has not entered it into force). 
76 See CHAISSE & THE E15, supra note 49, at 9. 
77 See, e.g., Nations Energy Corp. v. Republic of Panama, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19, 
Award, ¶ 39 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
78 See id. 
79 Chaisse, Investor-State, supra note 19, at 160.  
80 Model Text for the Indian Bilateral Investment Treaty, Dec. 28, 2015, Article 2.6 (iv). 
81 Id. 
82 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, H.K.-N.Z., Art. 8(2), 
July 6, 1995, Trade and Industry Dep’t, Gov’t of H.K. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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Meanwhile, states without mandatory arbitration in their BITs retain 
sovereignty by making new policies related to public interests, such as 
those related to the protection of public health and the environment. 
These states also escape the independent tribunal’s intervention and the 
possibility of an award to the person bringing the action.85 Although 
these states’ policies may sometimes decrease foreign investors’ 
interest, the mandatory arbitration under BITs cannot resolve these 
types of tax-related disputes.86  
The most common clause referring to tax-related disputes in BITs 
is the expropriation provision.87 Expropriation means to seize private 
property for a public purpose.88 There are two kinds of expropriation: 
direct and indirect.89 To tell the two apart, one can focus on the actual 
effect of the expropriation clause.90 Taxation measures are typically 
used as an indirect expropriation method and, in situations where tax-
related disputes arise, they can be resolved by the mandatory arbitration 
under BITs.91 For example, the case Link-Trading v. Moldova refers to 
the type of dispute mentioned above.92 In this case, the claimant 
protested that the defendant issued changes to the custom tax treatment, 
which violated governmental guarantees of tax stability. The claimant 
in this case claimed these tax changes substantially deprived the 
claimant of its business and constituted measures equivalent to 
expropriation.93 The claimant resorted to the mandatory arbitration in 
the United States-Moldova BIT.94 Another example of a taxpayer being 
deprived of business because of aggressive tax changes can be found 
in the case Tza Yap Shum v. Peru and in the accompanying award.95 
There is a remarkable consensus that taxation and tax measure 
85 See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal 
Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000). 
86 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27. 
87 Jasmin Kollmann & Laura Turcan, Overview of the Existing Mechanisms to Resolve 
Disputes and Their Challenges, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN TAX MATTERS 166–
67 (2016). 
88 William H. Reeves, Expropriation, Confiscation, Nationalization—What One Can Do 
About Them, 24 BUS. LAW. 867, 867 (1969). 
89 DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10, at 101. 
90 Id. 
91 See Link-Trading Stock Co. v. Dep’t for Customs Control of the Republic of Moldova, 
Final Award, ITA Inv. Treaty Cases (2002). 
92 See id. 
93 Id. at 10. 
94 Id. at 4. 
95 See generally Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, Award, 
(July 7, 2011). 
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enforcement can become expropriatory if the measures are 
“confiscatory, arbitrary, abusive, or discriminatory.”96 However, the 
expropriation clause has limitations. Based on case law, changes 
in taxation policies do not always trigger the expropriation clause.97 
Although sudden changes may lead to some disputes, these taxation 
changes are not treated as expropriation if the taxpayers do not lose 
possession of real property.98 
Even though foreign investors can win these types of cases in the 
end, it is difficult for them to proceed with the arbitration award all by 
themselves. If the losing party refuses to uphold the award, foreign 
investors can ask the states who signed the so-called New York 
Convention for help and then seize the losing party’s assets in their 
jurisdictions.99 These arbitration proceedings under BITs can be time- 
and money-consuming. As a result, foreign investors must waive 
certain substantial rights and profits to get the award.100 Accordingly, 
arbitration under BITs is an imperfect way to protect the taxpayers. 
Contracting states dislike mandatory arbitration in BITs because of 
its regulatory chilling effect.101 The regulatory chilling effect occurs 
because the high costs of investor-state arbitration can lead states to 
be reluctant to enact measures that could be a breach of their 
obligations.102 Inconsistent arbitration decisions that adopt “surprising 
investment obligation interpretations” exacerbate the chilling effect.103 
Therefore, as long as there is a possibility that measures can be a breach 
of BITs, the states are unlikely to initiate the measures—even in cases 
of public interest. However, this chilling effect is less critical in 
bilateral tax treaties. First, in tax-related areas, states are free to 
construct and implement the measures regardless of the mandatory 
arbitration clause in bilateral tax treaties. States are freer because the 
arbitration clause may not come into the play.104 Second, mandatory 
arbitration clauses’ involvement in bilateral tax treaties can be a 
96 Id. ¶ 181. 
97 Id. 
98 Chaisse, Investor-State, supra note 19, at 152.  
99 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 168. 
100 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27.  
101 See generally Now Try Collecting, ECONOMIST, (Aug. 2, 2014), https://www. 
economist.com/business/2014/08/02/now-try-collecting. 
102 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 43. 
103 Id. 
104 OECD Model 2014, supra note 19. 
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measure to prevent states from implementing measures that might be a 
breach of their obligations.105  
C. Dispute Resolution Methods in Bilateral Tax Treaties
Although mandatory arbitration in BITs can be reached to resolve 
tax-related disputes, the arbitral tribunal that mainly deals with 
investment issues may not be the ideal professional body to resolve 
those disputes. In these situations, the dispute resolution methods in 
the bilateral tax treaties between contracting states may be more 
appropriate for the parties. To resolve tax-related disputes, there are 
two steps for nonmandatory arbitration tax treaties and three steps for 
mandatory arbitration tax treaties. The first step is for the related 
competent authority to resolve the dispute unilaterally. The taxpayers 
choose a competent authority by submitting their dispute to said 
authority.106 If the competent authority cannot resolve the dispute in its 
entirety, then the second step is for the taxpayers to submit a request to 
initiate the MAP process.107 If the parties cannot resolve the dispute 
through the MAP process, the parties must follow the mandatory 
arbitration clause.  
The MAP process is controlled by the competent authorities, and 
taxpayers have little legal standing during the process. What taxpayers 
can do is provide some basic information and evidence related to the 
disputes in written materials.108 According to the 2017 OECD Model 
Convention, taxpayers submit their disputes to the relevant competent 
authority which attempts to unilaterally resolve the disputes before 
the MAP process.109 If the competent authority resolves the dispute 
unilaterally, the MAP process will not commence. The competent 
authority has full discretion to reject the submission of the disputes.110 
The major shortcoming of the competent authority’s entire decision-
105 See Explanatory Statement to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty 
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD (2016), https://www. 
oecd.org/tax/treaties/explanatory-statement-multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-
treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf.  
106 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 2017, 44 
(2017) [hereinafter OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017]. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 453. 
109 See id. at 44–45. 
110 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 155. 
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making process is the lack of transparency.111 This shortcoming is 
further highlighted when sensitive issues, like national interests, are 
involved in the disputes. The related state can control the process to 
some extent; in this regard, the state benefits from protecting its 
national sovereignty. 
Two kinds of tax-related arbitration exist: voluntary and mandatory. 
Some scholars, however, argue that all arbitration is voluntary in 
nature.112 They make this argument because the arbitration is based 
on a contract dispute between parties, and the disputing parties agreed 
to all aspects of the contract—including the arbitration clause.113 While 
the classification here is about the initiative method, voluntary 
arbitration can only be initiated when the competent authorities 
and taxpayers agree to said arbitration.114 Thus, the taxpayers cannot 
directly submit the disputes for arbitration. As a result, voluntary 
arbitration offers weak protection for taxpayers. The U.N. Model 
Convention requires that both competent authorities agree in order to 
initiate arbitration.115 If national interests are involved in the dispute, 
the competent authorities are less likely to support arbitration. In stark 
contrast, taxpayers can initiate mandatory arbitration without the 
competent authority’s confirmation as long as certain conditions are 
met.116 Thus, taxpayers are better equipped to protect themselves with 
mandatory rather than voluntary arbitration.  
The OECD initiated Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), which 
is related to mandatory arbitration, especially the fourteenth movement 
and the 2008 OECD Model Convention.117 Although BEPS is merely 
a suggestion for states, this dispute resolution method has been 
incorporated into some bilateral tax treaties, especially those of 
111 Jean-Pierre Lieb, Introduction: Taking the Debate Forward, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION IN TAX MATTERS 61 (2016). 
112 See generally Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as 
a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 121–50 (2006). 
113 See What Is an Arbitration Agreement?, FREEADVICE LEGAL (2019), https://law. 
freeadvice.com/litigation/arbitration/agreement_arbitration.htm. 
114 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 116. 
115 See UNITED NATIONS, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE 
TAXATION CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 31 (2011) 
[hereinafter U.N. 2011]. 
116 See OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106. 
117 See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
(OECD), MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 
2008 (2008) [hereinafter OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2008].  
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developed states. Despite being clearly regulated in the Model 
Convention, BEPS provides flexibility for states to incorporate dispute 
resolution. For example, the United States-Germany double tax treaty 
includes mandatory arbitration.118 But the United States and Germany 
included some restrictions on mandatory arbitration. According to the 
treaty, if the competent authorities cannot resolve a dispute, the dispute 
may be submitted for arbitration so long as the competent authorities 
agree to this dispute resolution method.119  
For example, in the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax 
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(MLI), China disallows mandatory arbitration in tax matters.120
Developing countries, like China and India, are more likely to use the 
MAP process to resolve tax-related disputes. The MAP process is a 
kind of diplomatic dispute resolution method in which the national 
interests can be significant.121 Developing countries have several 
concerns about tax-related mandatory arbitration.122 One concern is 
that tax-related arbitration is quite professional, which requires many 
highly skilled workers.123 For example, the competent authorities need 
highly skilled professional workers and the contracting parties need 
highly skilled tax lawyers.124 Developed states can put a lot of money 
and resources toward training professional staff, but developing states 
lack the money and resources to complete the training of their 
professional staff. Additionally, arbitration fees are expensive. In the 
arbitration sample of the OECD Model Convention, the competent 
authority that provides the arbitration meeting venue should bear the 
cost if the costs are essential.125  
118 See Protocol Amending the Convention Between the United States of America and 
the Federal Republic of Germany for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention 
of Fiscal Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes, Ger.-U.S., 
June 1, 2006, S. Treaty Doc. No. 109-20. 
119 Id. at 18. 
120 See MLI Positions, supra note 75 (the website has listed the countries which commit 
to mandatory arbitration in tax matters while China has signed but not entered into force). 
121 See Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 155. 
122 Lieb, supra note 111, at 68. 
123 Lennard, supra note 65, at 1047.  
124 U.N. 2011, supra note 115. 
125 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Competent Authorities of Canada and 
the United States of America, Can.-U.S., December 2008, Article 13, https://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-utl/2010_arbitration_mou_nov_8-10_-_final.pdf [hereinafter Can.-U.S. Memorandum 
of Understanding]. 
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Regardless of whether there is mandatory arbitration in BIT or in 
bilateral tax treaties, the cost of the arbitration is a big problem that the 
contracting states have to face.126 Being a party to an investor-state 
arbitration is capital intensive.127 Even if the state is successful, the 
costs of joining an arbitration are huge.128 State sovereignty is the main 
concern vis-à-vis arbitration, especially for the governments of 
developing states, including the Chinese government.129  
II 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION WILL NOT DECREASE 
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Mandatory arbitration in tax matters will not affect state sovereignty. 
Instead, mandatory arbitration is the symbol of state sovereignty. When 
compared to the mandatory arbitration clause in BITs, the arbitration 
process gives rise to concerns regarding its legitimacy and democratic 
accountability. One concern is whether there is “lack of knowledge on 
the part of tribunals regarding non-investment issues related to public 
policy considerations—like human rights and the environment.”130 In 
investor-state arbitration, investors only pursue their own commercial 
interests and do not pay enough attention to the public interest of the 
host state.131 Conversely, this can be an advantage in tax-related 
mandatory arbitration.132 This occurs because the process is a kind of 
state-to-state process. For example, in the baseball arbitration method, 
both competent authorities incorporate national interest considerations 
into the proposals they submit to the arbitral tribunal.133 In independent 
arbitration, the competent authorities can reach an agreement on the 
126 See Lieb, supra note 111, at 62.  
127 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 40. 
128 Id. 
129 See generally Lieb, supra note 111, at 68.  
130 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 40. 
131 See generally Caroline Henckels, Balancing Investment Protection and the Public 
Interest: The Role of the Standard of Review and the Importance of Deference in Investor-
State Arbitration, 4 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 197 (2013). 
132 See generally id. 
133 Lieb, supra note 111, at 58 (referring to this method, each of the disputing competent 
authorities will make their own dispute resolution proposals, and the arbitral tribunal will 
pick one from the two submissions). 
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terms of references, which contain the unresolved issues.134 This also 
protects national interests, which is discussed in more detail below.  
First, with regard to the accession to the MAP process, arbitration 
can only be initiated when one of the competent authorities requires 
it.135 In this respect, the related competent authorities can control 
the taxation to some extent. There may be various reasons why a state 
might not want to make a claim against another state due to diplomatic 
relations.136 Additionally, it does not matter whether a tax-related 
dispute falls under the OECD Model Convention or the U.N. Model 
Convention because MAP is essential to resolving the dispute.137 
Arbitration is a complementary part of MAP.138 As a result, based on 
the OECD Model Convention, if the competent authorities can resolve 
all disputes during the MAP process, then arbitration will not start.139 
That means that parties can only initiate arbitration when some 
disputes cannot be resolved during the MAP process. If the disputes 
cannot be resolved during the MAP process but can be solved during 
the arbitration procedure by MAP, the arbitration process ends.140 
However, under certain circumstances, mandatory arbitration cannot 
be used even when unresolved disputes remain after the MAP 
process.141 Under Section 25(3) of the OECD Model Convention, 
mandatory arbitration can only resolve tax-related disputes 
that actually happened.142 In contrast, under the MAP submission 
requirement, taxpayers can submit a dispute to the competent 
authorities so long as there is a possibility that the dispute might 
134 See generally Carlo Garbarino & Marina Lombardo, Arbitration of Unresolved 
Issues in Mutual Agreement Cases: The New Para. 5, Art. 25 of the OECD Model 
Convention, a Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution Clause, in TAX TREATIES: BUILDING 
BRIDGES BETWEEN LAW AND ECONOMICS 459 (Michael Lang et al. eds., 2010). 
135 UNITED NATIONS, DEP’T OF ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, MODEL DOUBLE TAXATION 
CONVENTION BETWEEN DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2017) [hereinafter 
U.N. 2017]. 
136 Chaisse, Investor-State, supra note 19, at 170. 
137 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27. 
138 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
COMMENTARIES ON THE ARTICLES OF THE MODEL TAX CONVENTION 2017 370 (2017) 
[hereinafter OECD MODEL COMMENTARIES 2017]. 
139 OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106. 
140 See OECD MODEL COMMENTARIES 2017, supra note 138. 
141 See id. at 372. 
142 See OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106. 
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happen.143 As a result, if the unresolved disputes are caused by a 
threat or possibility of a threat, the unresolved disputes cannot be 
submitted to the arbitral tribunal.144 At the same time, it does not matter 
whether the taxpayers are satisfied with the final agreement reached by 
the competent authorities through the MAP process.145 Even if the 
taxpayers are unsatisfied with the result, they cannot initiate 
arbitration.146 However, taxpayers can use local remedies for help—
such as  litigation or mediation.147 
Moreover, local litigation controls tax-related arbitration and is 
representative of state sovereignty.148 Taxpayers can only initiate 
arbitration when unresolved disputes remain after the MAP process.149 
However, if a local court or administrative panel resolves the disputes, 
taxpayers cannot initiate arbitration.150 When a local court resolves a 
dispute, the legitimacy of the local court’s award is protected in case it 
is against the final award made by the independent third party such as 
an arbitral tribunal.151 In the 2010 OECD sample mutual agreement on 
arbitration, the request for arbitration is accompanied by statements 
indicating that no domestic court or administrative body in either 
contracting state has rendered a decision.152 This also protects national 
interest by avoiding potential conflicts between the arbitral award and 
local decisions.153 
143 See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND CAPITAL ART. 25(1) (2010) [hereinafter OECD 
MODEL 2010]. 
144 See generally id. 
145 OECD MODEL COMMENTARIES 2017, supra note 138, at 371.  
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 375. 
148 Id. 
149 See OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106. 
150 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 121. 
151 See generally Julien Chaisse, The Shifting Tectonics of International Investment Law-
Structure and Dynamics of Rules and Arbitration on Foreign Investment in the Asia-Pacific 
Region, 47 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 563 (2015); U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., IIA 
Issues Note: Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, No. 1 (Feb. 2015), http://unctad.org/ 
en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf.; Julien Chaisse & Rahul Donde, The 
State of Investor-State Arbitration: A Reality Check of the Issues, Trends, and Directions in 
Asia-Pacific, 51 INT’L LAW. 47 (2018).  
152 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 121. 
153 See generally OECD MODEL 2010, supra note 143. 
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Second, mandatory arbitration in tax matters is still confidential 
between the contracting states.154 Because the entire arbitration process 
and most of the materials are confidential, state sovereignty is 
protected.155 Furthermore, the decisions reached under the MAP 
process are often not public in individual cases.156 Only when both 
competent authorities and the taxpayers agree on publication can a 
part of the final arbitral award be published, but the award contains 
none of the disputing parties’ identifying information.157 Thus, 
competent authorities can control the publication. Even though this 
lacks transparency, this control is beneficial for the national interest. 
However, if full decisions are published, a subsequent arbitral tribunal 
may consider the award when faced with the same issues.158 As a result, 
if the competent authorities lose the case, it is more likely they will lose 
again when faced with the same issues.159 If the awards are confidential, 
the arbitral tribunal should consider the facts on a case-by-case basis to 
protect the interests of the competent authorities. 
Third, there is a unified organization to hold and decide the case 
in mandatory arbitration under BITs.160 Yet no unified organization 
exists to hold and decide the tax-related disputes under bilateral tax 
treaties.161 In this situation, the baseball arbitration preferred by the 
United States government can be a good choice. Unlike the normal 
independent arbitral tribunal, which considers cases and makes 
decisions independently, the arbitral tribunal in baseball arbitration 
lacks discretion to make its own decisions.162 Instead, each of the 
disputing competent authorities submits its own dispute resolution 
proposal, and then the arbitral tribunal will pick one from the two 
submissions.163 If one competent authority wants its proposal to win, it 
154 OECD MODEL COMMENTARIES 2017, supra note 138, at 383. 
155 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 2017 
UPDATE TO THE OECD MODEL CONVENTION 216 (2017) [hereinafter OECD UPDATE]. 
156 See generally U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 
in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, 11 (Jan. 2014), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/ 
english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf. 
157  OECD UPDATE, supra note 155, at 215. 
158 See J. Scott Wilkie, Implementation of Arbitration Decisions in Domestic Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN TAX MATTERS 826 (2016). 
159 Id. 
160 See generally, e.g., DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 10. 
161 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27. 
162 What Is Baseball Arbitration?, ARBITRATION.COM (June 9, 2011), http://www. 
arbitration.com/articles/what-is-baseball-arbitration.aspx. 
163 Id. 
2020] The Changing Paradigm of International Tax  139 
Dispute Settlement: What Are the Promises and  
Challenges of Mandatory Arbitration for China? 
cannot be too biased or self-interested.164 On the contrary, it must reach 
a balance between the disputing competent authorities.165 And as the 
proposal is entirely put forward by the competent authorities 
themselves, without input from a third party, baseball arbitration 
protects state sovereignty and balances the interests of the two 
contracting states.  
Finally, the contracting states can narrow the scope of disputes 
arbitration can affect.166 For instance, in the OECD Model Convention, 
there is a difference between the MAP and mandatory arbitration 
related to the initiative reasons.167 In terms of the MAP process, 
taxpayers can initiate it when there is actual damage to their investment 
or if damage is likely to happen.168 That means that as long as the 
taxpayers suppose there is a possibility of damage, they can initiate a 
request to the competent authorities to start the MAP process. 
However, arbitration can only be initiated when there is an actual result 
that is not in accordance with the treaties between the contracting 
states.169 In other words, an actual result is required for mandatory 
arbitration in tax matters. Article 25 of the OECD Model Convention 
illustrates that only disputes related to paragraphs 1 and 2 can be 
covered in paragraph 5, which is mandatory binding arbitration.170 If a 
dispute is related to paragraph 3, which standardizes the interpretations 
of regulations in bilateral tax treaties and mutually resolves disputes 
that are not explicitly regulated in the tax-related treaties, arbitration 
cannot be initiated.171 This also protects national sovereignty because 
the competent authorities can interpret the bilateral tax treaties for their 
benefit without being afraid of intervention from the independent, 
third-party arbitral tribunal. Furthermore, if disputes arise because of 
policies promulgated by the host states related to their national 
interests, those interests should be excluded from the scope that tax-
related arbitration can cover.172 This can be clearly written in the 
164 Jeff Monhait, Baseball Arbitration: An ADR Success, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 
105, 132 (2013). 
165 Lieb, supra note 111, at 58–59. 
166 See generally Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 123. 
167 See generally OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 429–86. 
168 See OECD MODEL COMMENTARIES 2017, supra note 138. 
169 Id. at 372. 
170 Id.  
171 See generally Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 120. 
172 See generally id. at 127. 
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bilateral tax treaties.173 For example, protection of the environment is a 
significant national interest, and disputes related to it should not be 
decided by the third party.174 Moreover, some criteria should not be 
applied. For instance, the Most Favored Nation (MFN) criterion should 
be prohibited in application so that the states still control the arbitration. 
The mandatory arbitration clause should be negotiated on a case-by-
case and state-by-state basis.  
Because a bilateral tax treaty is essentially a contract, the contracting 
competent authorities should decide upon and control all aspects of 
the bilateral tax treaty.175 As a result, the competent authorities can 
explicitly make some regulations related to mandatory arbitration, such 
as the scope it can cover and how it will proceed. For example, the 
arbitrators can decide the rules for implementing arbitration procedures 
by themselves, which means that they can resort to the rules of the 
available institutions.176 If the competent authorities have reached 
an agreement on the procedural requirements, the arbitral tribunal 
should adhere to that agreement.177 For example, in the 2010 OECD 
Model Convention, “the procedural rules provided for in the sample 
agreement shall apply unless the competent authorities provide 
otherwise in the Terms of Reference.”178 Therefore, “it is possible for 
the competent authorities, through the Terms of Reference, to depart 
from any of these rules or to provide for additional rules in a particular 
case.”179 This means that the competent authorities can control the 
arbitration procedures to some extent, which in turn allows them to 
protect their national interests. Although it is within the competent 
authorities’ discretion to decide the Terms of Reference and limit them 
in a particular issue or set of disputes, they can draft the Terms of 
Reference to include the entire case and all the issues related with the 
consent of both authorities.180 They are free to make the decision.  
173 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27. 
174 See generally id.  
175 Brian J. Arnold, The Scope of Arbitration Under Tax Treaties, in INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION IN TAX MATTERS 124 (2016). 
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2020] The Changing Paradigm of International Tax  141 
Dispute Settlement: What Are the Promises and  
Challenges of Mandatory Arbitration for China? 
The degree of the taxpayer’s involvement depends on the 
discretionary power of the competent tax authorities.181 For example, 
only once both the arbitrators and competent authorities agree during 
arbitration can the taxpayers then make an oral statement during 
the process.182 From the OECD Model Convention, the taxpayers 
are excluded from the arbitration process as a claimant.183 The whole 
arbitral process is a state versus state case, and the two contracting 
states may drop a case because of political or diplomatic concerns.184 
After the arbitral tribunal reaches an award, the competent authorities 
should reach a mutual agreement to implement it.185 The 2017 
OECD Model Convention states, “The competent authorities of the 
Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of 
application of this paragraph.”186 Simply put, the disputing competent 
authorities control the method for invoking the award.  
In addition, the competent authorities can still protect their national 
sovereignty once the arbitration has commenced, as long as the final 
award is not delivered to them. Most states will not allow a person to 
simultaneously pursue the MAP process and domestic legal 
remedies.187 Some states, however, allow a person to simultaneously 
pursue both the MAP process and proceedings before a court or 
administrative tribunal for the same issue.188 In those states, a court or 
administrative tribunal may issue a decision after a request for 
arbitration has been made but before the arbitral panel delivers its 
decision.189 In this situation, the arbitration process may be terminated 
to avoid difficulties that may arise when applying the mutual agreement 
in implementing a subsequent arbitration decision.190 In this situation, 
both the arbitration and the MAP process can be treated as not having 
181 See generally OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 481. 
182 Id. at 471. 
183 See id. at 470–72.  
184 CHAISSE & THE E15, supra note 49, at 10. 
185 OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 44.  
186 Id. at 45. 
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188 Kollmann & Turcan, supra note 87, at 87. 
189 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 19. 
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(2017). 
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been initiated at all.191 Furthermore, the 2014 OECD sample mutual 
agreement on arbitration provides that 
notwithstanding paragraphs 6, 15, 16 and 17, where, at any time after 
a request for arbitration has been made and before the arbitrators have 
delivered a decision to the competent authorities, and the person who 
made the request for arbitration, the competent authorities must 
notify in writing the arbitrators and that person that they have solved 
all the unresolved issues described in the Terms of Reference, the 
case shall be considered as solved under the mutual agreement 
procedure and no arbitration decision shall be provided.192  
“This agreement applies to any request for arbitration made pursuant to 
paragraph 5 of Article 25 of the Convention.”193 
Even if the arbitral tribunal has reached the arbitration award, the 
competent authorities can still protect their national interests. For 
example, according to the 2017 U.N. Model Convention, the competent 
authorities can reach a different agreement within six months of the 
arbitration award.194 An arbitration decision is “binding on both States 
and shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the 
domestic laws of these States unless both competent authorities agree 
on a different solution within six months after the decision has been 
communicated to them.”195 Because of this provision, the competent 
authorities can better protect their interests. According to paragraph 18 
of the OECD Sample Mutual Agreement on Arbitration, the courts 
of one of the contracting states may find the arbitration decision 
unenforceable.196 Where a contracting state finds a decision is 
unenforceable, “the request for arbitration shall be considered not to 
have been made and the arbitration process shall be considered not to 
have taken place.”197 Thus, the time limit in the domestic laws does not 
affect implementation of the final arbitral award, so the contracting 
states still have options to restrict an award’s implementation if it 
violates the national interest of one of the contracting states.198 As 
opposed to the implementation of arbitral awards under BITs, there are 
191 Id. 
192 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD), 
MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL: CONDENSED VERSION 2014, 404 
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no consequences if the losing contracting state does not follow the 
arbitral decision. When it comes to international tax law arbitral 
decision enforcement, Article 25(5) of the OECD Model Convention 
states, “Unless a person directly affected by the case does not accept 
the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration decision, that 
decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and shall 
be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic 
laws of these States.”199 Under the OECD Model Convention, the 
implementation of an arbitral award relies on the mutual agreement 
reached by the competent authorities.200 Consequently, the competent 
authorities can control how the arbitral award is implemented to some 
extent.  
Finally, the binding effect of the arbitration decision is limited to the 
issues submitted to arbitration and to the specifics of the case presented 
to the competent authorities.201 The contracting states are not bound by 
the arbitration decision with regard to future taxable years or with 
regard to different taxpayers.202 Arbitration decisions cannot be treated 
as precedent.203  
III 
WHY TAXPAYERS TEND TO CHOOSE MANDATORY ARBITRATION 
OVER MAP 
In bilateral tax treaties, there are two kinds of dispute resolution 
methods.204 One is MAP, and the other is the mandatory arbitration 
clause.205 Although some countries have incorporated the mandatory 
arbitration clause in their treaties, MAP dominates as the main 
resolution method for tax-related disputes and is more favorable to the 
contracting states.206 Based on the 14 Action Report, several measures 
have been initiated to ensure the MAP process is efficient.207 However, 
taxpayers tend to rely on the mandatory arbitration clause as the 
199 OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2008, supra note 117, at 38. 
200 Id.  
201 Chaisse, Investor-State, supra note 19, at 152. 
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203 OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 471. 
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preferred method for tax-related disputes for several reasons, as 
described below.208  
A. Taxpayers Enjoy More Rights with Mandatory Arbitration
Foreign investors will be more confident with tax-related arbitration
than the MAP process because they have more rights under mandatory 
arbitration.209 Under the OECD Model Convention, foreign investors 
have the right to initiate arbitration instead of the competent 
authorities.210 As long as there are unresolved disputes after the MAP 
process, foreign investors can require mandatory arbitration after a 
written request.211 However, the decision to initiate the MAP process is 
controlled by the competent authorities.212 As long as the disputes can 
be resolved unilaterally, regardless of whether the taxpayers are 
satisfied, the MAP process cannot proceed.213 What is worse, some 
states put barriers on the accession to the MAP process.214 For example, 
if these disputes have been submitted to litigation or to the 
administrative tribunal, the MAP process cannot proceed until 
an award is issued.215 Furthermore, the MAP process can only be 
initiated once both competent authorities receive the taxpayers’ full 
information.216 However, when either or both competent authorities 
deem that the information is incomplete, the taxpayers have no 
choice but to resubmit more related information.217 This illustrates the 
powerful control the competent authorities have over access to the 
MAP process. It should be emphasized that the taxpayers are not a party 
to the arbitration procedure, as it is a procedure between the competent 
authorities.218 However, having the taxpayers involved in the dispute 
resolution process to some extent may be beneficial because taxpayers 
can provide some evidence to help protect their benefits. With the 
approval of arbitral tribunal and competent authorities, taxpayers 
208 Chaisse, Investor-State, supra note 19. 
209 See generally LANG & OWENS, supra note 27. 
210 OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 453. 
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can make an oral statement.219 In addition, the 2008 OECD Model 
Convention provides that taxpayers can veto the award reached by 
the arbitral tribunal if they are unsatisfied with it.220 The Model 
Convention states, “Unless a person directly affected by the case does 
not accept the mutual agreement that implements the arbitration 
decision, such decision shall be binding on both Contracting States and 
shall be implemented notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic 
laws of these States.”221 This means that the taxpayers can control the 
arbitration to some extent, which better protects their interests.  
B. Mandatory Arbitration Can Make Up for MAP’s Shortcomings
Foreign investors invest more in countries with tax-related
mandatory arbitration because it addresses many shortcomings in the 
MAP process.222 For one thing, the MAP process only requires the 
competent authorities to “endeavor” to try their best to resolve 
disputes.223 Therefore, no particular result is required.224 No matter 
whether the dispute is totally resolved, partly resolved, or unresolved, 
the competent authorities will not be blamed.225 Moreover, some 
competent authorities do not come to the table in good faith and refuse 
to change their aggressive or unreasonable positions.226 While the 
BEPS Action 14 includes a minimum requirement to “ensure the treaty 
obligations related to the mutual agreement procedure are fully 
implemented in good faith and the MAP cases are resolved in a timely 
manner,” the measures to achieve this standard are not particularly 
functional.227 As a result, the competent authorities must consider the 
benefits of taxpayers involved more in mandatory arbitration, 
rendering the MAP process more efficient in some situations.228  
However, there are no follow-up measures to implement the result 
even if it is reached. Although the result reached by the competent 
219 U.N. 2011, supra note 115, at 433. 
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authorities is binding, if the losing party does not obey the award, there 
are no follow-up measures to punish the losing party.229 In addition, the 
investors cannot reach arbitration before the MAP process ends.230 This 
process is not only time-consuming but also has an adverse effect 
on the management of investments.231 Under the OECD Model 
Convention, the MAP process should be completed in two years.232 Yet 
under the U.N. Model Convention, the period is extended to three 
years.233 In practice, MAP is not fair for a specific foreign investor 
because the competent authorities will not initiate the MAP process for 
only one case.234 In contrast, foreign investors will make use of the 
MAP process to resolve a group of cases as a whole so that the 
contracting competent authorities can simultaneously decide that group 
of cases.235 In this process, the justice of one specific case will not be 
protected, and the profits of one specific taxpayer are more likely to be 
sacrificed for the interests of the state.236 Finally, there is a situation 
where each competent authority treats its interpretation of tax 
convention as correct and the opposing competent authority’s 
interpretation as incorrect.237 With MAP, this kind of situation will be 
less likely to be resolved than with mandatory arbitration.238 Mandatory 
arbitration can resolve this dilemma for the benefit of all the 
stakeholders without contradicting the global trends. 
Foreign taxpayers chase stable investing environments, and tax-
related mandatory arbitration can provide the certainty necessary for 
investment. This is because arbitration can make up for MAP’s 
shortcomings in resolving tax-related disputes for the following 
reasons.  
First, arbitration is less biased compared to MAP.239 Because the 
MAP process is completely controlled by the competent authorities, the 
profits of taxpayers are inevitably ignored when there is a need to 
229 Chaisse, BEPS, supra note 33, at 24. 
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balance the national interests between the contracting states.240 The 
arbitral tribunal, however, is more independent.241 To illustrate this 
point, the OECD Model Sample states that 
each arbitrator must, at the time of accepting his or her appointment, 
be impartial and independent of the competent authorities, tax 
administrations, and ministries of finance (or relevant equivalent 
ministries or departments, regardless of their name) of the 
Contracting States, as well as all persons directly affected by the case 
and their advisors. Each arbitrator must also maintain his or her 
impartiality and independence throughout the proceedings, and must, 
for a reasonable period of time thereafter, avoid conduct that may 
damage the appearance of impartiality and independence of the 
arbitrators with respect to the proceedings.242 
Second, because the contracting states are concerned about their 
state sovereignty, they are more likely to reach an agreement during the 
MAP process, thereby increasing the efficiency of MAP to some 
extent.243 For example, the two-year period of the MAP process is not 
fixed.244 For one thing, the taxpayers who present their case can request 
a suspension of the MAP process, and the two-year period can be 
suspended after the competent authorities agree to it.245 For another, 
the competent authorities can suspend the two-year period if they have 
to wait for an award pending with the court or administrative 
organization.246 Most importantly, if the competent authorities decide 
to suspend the MAP process because the two-year period is too short, 
they do so and inform the taxpayers who presented the case.247 In this 
situation, the taxpayers have no control over the decision to suspend 
the MAP process and only receive a notification.248 The competent 
authorities can also suspend the two-year period without reasonable 
arguments, and mandatory arbitration can push the competent 
authorities to resolve the disputes more quickly.249 
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Finally, a taxpayer can enjoy more profits after the arbitral award 
has been made. First, if the taxpayers are not satisfied with the 
arbitration award, they have veto power and can reach local 
remedies.250 Taxpayers do not have to explicitly express their veto 
power.251 The movements of taxpayers can illustrate an arbitral award’s 
rejection.252 For instance, if the taxpayers do not terminate the resolved 
issues from the local court or administrative tribunal, this is treated as 
an objection that stops the award from proceeding.253 Second, if the 
taxpayers accept the award, both of the disputing competent authorities 
are bound by it.254 The competent authorities must reach a mutual 
agreement to implement the arbitral award.255 Last, there is no time 
limit in implementing the award regardless of the domestic 
regulations.256  
IV 
OTHER BENEFITS OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
IN TAX MATTERS 
Arbitration can not only make up for the shortcomings of MAP but 
can also benefit taxpayers and states because the cost of litigation is 
avoided. Section 25(5) of the OECD Model Convention provides that 
if disputes are resolved by litigation, arbitration cannot be initiated—
regardless of whether the litigation was in domestic or international 
court.257 However, because litigation is time- and money-consuming, it 
is not ideal for taxpayers, especially when they want a speedy 
resolution. Furthermore, with limited resources and a lack of qualified 
staff, a domestic court is unlikely to be as professional as a mandatory 
arbitral tribunal.258 As a result, even if the lower court has already made 
an award, taxpayers are not prohibited from reaching for mandatory 
arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method.259 
Taxpayers always prefer mandatory arbitration in tax matters, and 
there are some instances where the competent authorities also like to 
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251 See OECD MODEL CONDENSED 2017, supra note 106, at 459. 
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make use of it. For the competent authorities, MAP is always preferable 
to mandatory binding tax-related arbitration because it helps them 
maintain their relationship with the taxpayers.260 However, there may 
be some situations where taxpayers face some controversial or sensitive 
issues and, accordingly, prefer to resolve them outside of the MAP 
process.261 In these situations, mandatory arbitration can be a good 
choice for the taxpayers.  
V 
CHINA SHOULD ADOPT A MIXED ARBITRATION SYSTEM 
There are two kinds of arbitration. One is institutional arbitration, 
and the other is ad hoc arbitration.262 Arbitration in tax matters is ad 
hoc arbitration. This means that one specific group of arbitrators will 
focus on one specific case.263 Faced with each case, the competent 
authorities can reach a specific Term of Reference in proceeding with 
the arbitration.264  
There are two kinds of arbitration used in resolving tax- 
related disputes:  (1) baseball or “last best offer” arbitration, and  
(2) independent arbitration.265 The OECD Model Convention
commentaries provide for both kinds of arbitration, and competent
authorities may choose to use either one.266 However, baseball
arbitration is mainly initiated by the government of the United States
but is otherwise seldom used.267
With baseball arbitration, each contracting state proposes an offer to 
resolve the dispute, and the panel of arbitrators must choose from the 
two offers.268 In other words, the panel cannot decide the case by itself. 
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The most significant benefit of baseball arbitration is its efficiency. The 
competent authorities can give some guidance to efficiently implement 
the arbitration clause.269 For instance, the United States government has 
created many detailed guidelines in its tax treaty with Canada.270 The 
United States-Canada tax treaty not only provides clear deadlines for 
the submissions made by the competent authorities, but it also provides 
a maximum page count for each individual document.271 Additionally, 
the powers of the chair of the arbitral tribunal are limited when it comes 
to requiring additional information.272  
Another advantage of baseball arbitration is that it is much cheaper 
than independent arbitration. Because baseball arbitration does not 
require reasoning and is based on tax treaties, the entire process 
is shorter and speedier.273 As a result, it requires only a limited number 
of hearings.274 For the board of arbitrators, technological methods such 
as emails or videos are recommended for communicating.275 Except for 
extraordinary circumstances, face-to-face meetings are not needed.276 
All of these aspects of baseball arbitration lead to a cheaper award.277  
However, baseball arbitration requires experienced and competent 
authorities. The panel of arbitrators must choose one proposal from 
the two submissions, and it will try to reach a balance by picking the 
least extreme option.278 Developed states are more familiar with the 
procedures and principles of baseball arbitration, while developing 
states may submit more extreme proposals that are most suitable for 
their own benefit due to a lack of experience.279 As a result, regardless 
of which kind of arbitration is used, both the developed and developing 
states need an experienced staff to implement arbitration. 
Independent arbitration is mainly used and accepted as a method for 
tax dispute resolution.280 The arbitral tribunal decides the case on its 
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own, and the final award is unaffected by competent authorities.281 
With more professional and less biased arbitrators, the final award 
can be more reliable.282 A significant difference between baseball and 
independent arbitration is that independent arbitration requires 
a written opinion.283 The OECD commentary even emphasizes the 
importance of the written award, arguing that it will be much easier for 
the taxpayers to accept the opinion when they know the methods 
through which the arbitrators reached their decision.284 Although it has 
no formal precedential value, a written opinion can be a reference point 
for subsequent arbitrators when they encounter similar issues.285 
China should develop a mixed arbitration system. For resolving 
simple and obvious disputes over small amounts of money, China 
should use baseball arbitration. Because of its efficiency, baseball 
arbitration is the most suitable form of arbitration for uncomplicated 
disputes. Furthermore, this method is a proper way to balance the 
interests of both competent authorities without destroying the 
relationship between them. When faced with more complex disputes, 
China should use independent arbitration. In these situations, the 
arbitral tribunal can analyze the case based on all materials that the 
competent authorities and taxpayers have submitted and make the final 
award. Independent arbitration is a great way for developing states, like 
China, to become more familiar with international standards. As a 
result of increased familiarity, China can improve its domestic certainty 
and attract more FDI. 
According to the OECD Model Convention, the arbitration award is 
binding for both competent authorities.286 The binding effect means 
that the competent authorities have to accept the arbitration as a dispute 
resolution method when they cannot resolve disputes during the MAP 
process.287 The binding effect also means that an arbitral award is 
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binding only if the taxpayers reject the award.288 In this situation, the 
binding effect of the arbitral awards can give more confidence to 
foreign taxpayers.  
One fundamental reason for establishing a special economic zone 
(SEZ) is to develop the economy of a specific region within a single 
jurisdiction.289 China can utilize SEZs as an experimental forum to test 
new policies.290 The term SEZ includes free trade zones (FTZs), which 
lie outside the host state’s customs territory.291 In FTZs, certain goods 
enjoy tax exemptions.292 China can experiment with mandatory 
arbitration in tax matters in some FTZs of mainland China. If China 
implements the mixed arbitration system well, it can regulate the 
system with a statute and use the system across the country. If the 
mixed arbitration system does not function well, China can improve the 
system.  
Implementing mandatory arbitration in FTZs has several 
advantages. First, controlling the implementation and scope of 
arbitration is easier in FTZs compared to all of China.293 The 
corporations in FTZs are more powerful and can be great advocates for 
mandatory arbitration.294 Additionally, FTZs have a great number of 
highly educated and experienced staff members who are more qualified 
than the staff in less developed places.295 Thus, staff members in FTZs 
may be more qualified to resolve tax-related disputes. The core policies 
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of FTZs include many favorable taxation measures.296 With the help 
of these taxation policies, areas around FTZs also benefit from their 
developments.297 In sum, China can experiment with these policy 
innovations in the FTZs and it can later implement them in the whole 
state once they are mature. 
CONCLUSION 
 China should utilize two different kinds of arbitration for resolving 
tax-related disputes: baseball arbitration and independent arbitration. 
China should implement a mixed arbitration system. China should use 
baseball arbitration to resolve simple disputes and independent 
arbitration to resolve more complicated disputes. Before implementing 
this mixed arbitration system across the country, China can first test the 
system in SEZs. By starting only in SEZs, China can fix any defects in 
the system. Mandatory arbitration in tax matters is useful for resolving 
tax-related disputes.298 For one thing, if mandatory arbitration is 
applied, China can be seen by foreign investors and other countries as 
being committed to offering a predictable and secure investment 
regime.299 For another, mandatory arbitration “creates an incentive 
to develop domestic polices favorable to attracting new investment 
and maintaining ongoing investment, including policies that are 
predictable, certain, and transparent.”300 Based on the certainty it brings 
for taxpayers, mandatory arbitration can better protect foreign 
investors, attract more FDI, and, in the long term, foster a more 
sustainable economic development.  
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